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Cross-Border Crowdfunding  
- Towards a Single Crowdfunding Market for Europe◊  
Dirk Zetzsche+ & Christina Preiner* 
 
Abstract: Crowdfunding has experienced rapid growth in some 
EU Member States. However, home bias by investors and 
regulatory barriers prevent the crowd and the project from 
moving freely across borders. Crowdfunding has, for the most 
part, remained a phenomenon of those larger Member States that 
‘draw a crowd’, with a population large enough to make a 
crowdfunding website an economically feasible undertaking. In 
turn, crowdfunding has remained a mainly national issue, 
prompting the European Commission to conclude that there is 
no need for a harmonization of crowdfunding rules in Europe. 
In contrast to the European Commission’s Capital Market Action 
Plan, this paper takes the view that national limitations on crowd 
investing and crowd lending de facto are the result of limits de 
iure. Given that no European passport is tailor made or fits 
crowdfunding, this source of financing is doomed to remain 
national. Moreover, with different legal requirements in Member 
States, European law hinders the development of cross-border 
crowdfunding within the region. This is particularly true for 
smaller Member States whose populations are too small to 
constitute ‘a crowd’. This paper details how European regulators 
could facilitate a Single European Crowdfunding Market while 
limiting both the risks for investors and the regulatory burden for 
crowdfunding platforms and recipients. In light of the regulatory 
experience with other financial products and the segregating 
effect of product-based approaches, many of which exist in the 
EU/EEA Member States, we believe existing product regulation 
is insufficient to enable a European cross-border crowdfunding 
market. Instead, regulation based on the ‘MiFID light’ 
framework could function as basis for a cross-border 
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crowdfunding manager passport, given the minimum protection 
it affords both investors and the financial system, and the low 
costs it imposes on the platform. Following the (1) too-small-to-
care, (2) too-large-to-ignore, and (3) too-big-to-fail development 
path of FinTech business models, we suggest adding a relevance 
threshold of EUR250,000 in transaction volume to the MiFID 
light framework and imposing regulation to address systemic 
risk concerns for very large crowdfunding platforms that may 
arise in the future.  
Keywords: Financial Regulation, Crowdfunding, FinTech, 
Crowdlending, Equity based Crowdfunding, Crowdinvesting, 
CRD IV, CRR, MiFID, MiFIR, UCITSD, AIFMD. 
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I. Introduction 
Crowdfunding - an outcome of the modern sharing economy1 - 
has experienced rapid growth in some EU Member States, 
notably the UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.2 
However, home bias by investors and regulatory barriers 
including different approaches by several Member States 
prevent crowd-funded projects and ‘the crowd’ from moving 
freely across borders. In turn, crowdfunding has remained a 
mainly national issue.3 For the most part, crowdfunding has 
remained a phenomenon of the larger Member States that can 
‘draw a crowd’, specifically those with a large enough 
population to make a crowdfunding venture an economically 
feasible undertaking. There is a valid concern that cross-border 
crowdfunding –already being low in volume4 – is going to 
                                                          
1
  See Vassilis Hatzopoulos & Sofia Roma, Caring for Sharing? The 
Collaborative Economy under EU Law, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 81 
(2017). 
2
  See the summary of European Parliament — Crowdfunding in Europe - 
Introduction and State of Play (January 2017); European Commission, 
Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets Union, at 14, SWD 154 final 
(2016)  (holding that “most platforms were located in the United Kingdom 
(143), followed by France (77) and Germany (65)”); Lars Klöhn, Lars 
Hornuf & Tobias Schilling, The Regulation of Crowdfunding in the German 
Small Investor Protection Act: Content, Consequences, Critique, 
Suggestions, 13:2 EUR. COMP. L. 57 (2016) (detailing growth for 
Germany).  
3
  The related concerns have been addressed by European and international 
policy bodies, see the review by ESMA, Opinion: Investment Based 
Crowdfunding, ESMA/2014/1378 (Dec.18, 2014) available at 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-
1378_opinion_on_investment-based_crowdfunding.pdf (last visited Oct.11, 
2016); European Commission, Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets 
Union, SWD 154 final (2016), supra note 2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/docs/crowdfunding/160428-
crowdfunding-study_en.pdf (last visited Oct.11, 2016) and EC, 
Crowdfunding: Mapping EU Markets and Events Study (30.9.2015) 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-
policy/docs/crowdfunding/20150930-crowdfunding-study_en.pdf (last 
visited Jul.8, 2016), on regulatory frameworks for CF; as well as IOSCO, 
Statement on Addressing Regulation of Crowdfunding (December 2015), 
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD521.pdf 
(last visited Oct.11, 2016); and IOSCO, Crowdfunding 2015 Survey 
Responses Report (December 2015), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD520.pdf (last visited 
Oct.11, 2016); IOSCO, Research Report on Financial Technologies 
(Fintech) (February 2017), available at 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf (last visited 
May 14, 2017). 
4
  See European Parliament — Crowdfunding in Europe - Introduction and 
State of Play, at 5 (January 2017). Amount raised cross-border in 2013 
represented 8,5% and 7,3%, cross-border being defined as location of the 
platform being in a different Member State than location of the project. We 
are not aware of data with regard to cross-border funding raising, i.e. 
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decline even further, in line with increased national legislation 
being put into place. Regulatory attention has thus shifted from 
initial curiosity to ensuring ‘that crowdfunding can be done 
seamlessly across borders.’5  
We support that view. Drawing on the experience of other 
financial products, such as the early days of Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), we 
take the view that Crowdfunding (‘CF’) can only reach its full 
potential if national regulatory regimes within the EU and EEA 
do not inhibit the use of crowdfunding platforms.  
This paper focuses on commercial approaches to crowdfunding 
as investment, reward or peer-to-peer lending schemes.6 
Donation-based or charitable crowdfunding is out of scope. 
While the literature has focused on crowdfunding economics,7 
its benefits for financing small innovative ventures and the 
associated risks for investors,8 this paper takes up the mission of 
                                                          
location of the platform being located in different Member States than 
location of investors.  
5
  See European Parliament — Resolution of 26 May 2016 on the Single 
Market Strategy (2015/2354(INI)), at 21. In turn, the European Commission 
has initiated a study on cross-border crowdfunding in Europe.  
6
  Other forms include donation-based crowdfunding, where people donate for 
a specific charitable project, rewards-based models, where investors provide 
funding in form of a donation and expect to receive non-financial rewards or 
goods in exchange.  
7
  Lars Hornuf & Armin Schwienbacher, Funding Dynamics in 
Crowdinvesting  5 (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2612998; 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 561, 569 (2015); Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, The Lemons 
Problem in Crowdfunding, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & 
PRIVACY L. 253, 256 (2013-2014); A. Christine Hurt, Pricing 
Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, U. Ill. L. REV. 
217, 224 (2015); Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, Some 
Simple Economics of Crowdfunding, 14 INNOV. POL. & ECON.. 63, 74 
(2014); See Klöhn, Hornuf & Schilling, supra note 2 at 56–66; C. Steven 
Bradford, Regulating Investment Crowdfunding: Small Business Capital 
Formation and Investor Protection, ZBB, 376, 377 (2015); See also Ricarda 
B. Bouncken, Malvine Komorek & Sascha Kraus, Crowdfunding: The 
Current State Of Research, 14 INT’L. BUS. & ECON. RES. J. 3, 407 
(2015). 
8
  Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the 
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the Crowd, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 
831 (2014); Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social 
Networks and the Securities Laws - Why the Specially Tailored Exemption 
Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N. C. L. REV. 1735, 
1737 (2011-12); Jorge Pesok, Crowdfunding: A New Form of Investing 
Requires a New Form of Investor Protection, 12 DARTMOUTH L.J. 146, 
149 et seq. (2014); Andrew C. Fink, Protecting the Crowd and Raising 
Capital through the Crowdfund Act, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 8, 31 
(2012-2013). 
 5
the EC’s Capital Market Union action plan9 and reviews the 
steps that are necessary to develop a true cross-border market for 
crowdfunding in Europe. A true cross-border crowdfunding 
market has two dimensions: projects in one Member State may 
be funded via platforms located in different Member States, and 
investors will also examine platforms and projects in other 
Member States. If this occurs, risk for funding innovative 
businesses may be spread across Europe while potential demand 
may be maximized.  
The paper is structured as follows: Part two will summarise the 
discussion to date and will highlight the importance of cross-
border crowdfunding, unlocking its potential to close the seed 
funding gap for European enterprises. Part three outlines options 
for regulation implementation, regulation of the product, sales 
and distribution, and manager regulation. We argue that manager 
regulation is most suited to facilitating a Crowdfunding Capital 
Markets Union as it retains an open approach to innovation while 
mitigating the agency risks imposed on investors and funded 
enterprises when using a crowdfunding platform. Taking into 
account that European financial law underwent a significant 
expansion over the last ten years, part four proposes a pan-
European crowdfunding regime based on Article 4 (1) No. 2 (c) 
CRR, an often overlooked exemption for small financial 
intermediaries based on the MiFID framework. With small 
modifications, a European passport based on the ‘MiFiD light’ 
rules referred to in Article 4 (1) No. 2 (c) CRR could close the 
circle (or more precisely: the triangle) in furthering a single 
European capital market, protecting investors and keeping down 
costs for intermediaries, funded firms and investors. 
II. Regulating crowdfunding 
The market for crowdfunding across Europe is fragmented and 
diverse and includes more than 500 platforms. The crowd may 
donate, invest, lend or buy, or they may expect non-financial 
rewards.10 The common denominator in the investment, reward 
or peer-to-peer lending schemes that this paper focuses on is the 
participation of a large number of funders who grant modest 
individual contributions gathered via the internet and who expect 
                                                          
9
  European Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, at 
7, COM (2015) 468 final (Sept. 30, 2015). The CMU action plan builds on 
the Commission’s previous work, in particular European Commission, 
Consultation Document: Crowdfunding in the EU- Exploring the Added 
Value of Potential EU Action (Oct. 3, 2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/consultati
on-document_en.pdf (last visited Oct.11, 2016) leading to the EC, 
Communication: Unleashing the Potential of Crowdfunding in the European 
Union, COM (2014) 172 final (March 27, 2014). 
10
  European Commission on Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets Union, 
supra note 2, at 8 et seq. (identifying 8 different categories); see also 
Simone Baumann, Crowdinvesting im Finanzmarktrecht, 8 et seq. (2014). 
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a return on their investment.11 A platform that, as a minimum, 
provides the online infrastructure and some basic information on 
the activities to be funded, mediates between the project and the 
crowd. Although a platform is not necessary for collecting 
capital via crowdfunding, its use is common.12  
The concept is driven by the idea of collective intelligence.13 
Crowdfunding promises to democratise financing processes and 
create a level playing field for competing ideas. The judgement 
of the ‘swarm’ is deemed to be as wise as that of professional 
asset managers, investors or creditors. While collecting funds 
from a large number of people is not innovative per se – we find 
the same approach has been used by honest entrepreneurs, 
fraudsters and creators of Ponzi schemes for hundreds of years14 
–, the innovative aspect of crowdfunding is the use of the 
internet, essentially social media, as a marketing and 
communication tool.  
In this section, we argue that crowdfunding creates certain 
benefits. These benefits, however, do not justify an exemption 
from financial law altogether given that all established objectives 
of European financial law15 apply: investor protection, systemic 
risk prevention, stakeholder protection and facilitation of a 
single European market for financial services.  
1. Benefits of crowdfunding  
Europe is in desperate need of growth, and SMEs are at the core 
of economic growth and employment. Although SME access to 
finance has improved significantly, it remains one of the most 
pressing challenges in furthering economic growth and 
innovation.16 Between 54%-75% of external SME finance is 
                                                          
11
  Fink, supra note 8, at 9; Sharon Yamen & Yoel Goldfeder, Equity 
Crowdfunding – A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: The Implication of 
Crowdfunding Legislation under the JOBS Act, 11 INT’L L. & MGMT. 
REV. 41, 57 (2015). 
12
  Baumann, supra note 10, at 21 et seq. 
13
  See most prominently James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the 
Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes 
Business, Economies, Societies and Nations (2005). 
14
  See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Prinzipien der kollektiven Vermoegensanlage (transl. 
Principles of Collective Investments) 275-431 (2015). 
15
  For a discussion see Dirk A. Zetzsche, Anatomy of European Investment 
Funds Law at III, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2951681; Dirk A. 
Zetzsche, Investment Law as Financial Law: From Fund Governance over 
Market Governance to Stakeholder Governance?, 339, in THE 
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET IN TRANSITION, (S. Birkmose, M. 
Neville & K.E. Sørensen eds., 2012). 
16
  See ECB — Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises in the Euro 
Area, at 6 (October 2015 to March 2016, June 2016), available at 
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sourced from bank loans, while market-based finance is under-
represented.17 Market-based finance finds itself in the midst of 
the EU Plans for establishing a European Capital Markets 
Union.18  
Crowdfunding’s focus is on financing of SMEs and emerging 
Start-ups. Financing of innovative ideas is difficult. Bank 
financing is barely accessible due to high information 
asymmetries and typically a lack of collateral.19 Financing by 
angel investors or seed venture capital financing is scarce. 
Venture capitalists turn down as much as 99% of the projects 
proposed to them.20 Often the entrepreneur’s family and friends 
step in. Rather than the quality of the business concept, 
successful seed financing often depends on geography, networks 
or gender.21  
Crowdfunding, in particular peer-to-peer lending and equity 
funding, effectively channels funds from households to those 
parts of the economy that are not served by traditional financiers, 
providing funding for projects that may otherwise not be 
financed.22 Compared to other forms of market-based finance, 
                                                          
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html, 
(last visited Oct.19, 2016). 
17
  For 54% see ECB Survey, supra note 16, at 13. See also SWD 154 final 
(2016), supra note 2, at 3 (“Access to finance for young, innovative firms is 
a problem even in countries where access to bank finance has remained 
stable throughout the crisis. Thanks to their strong local networks and 
relationships, banks will continue to provide the majority of funding to 
SMEs. However, only 41% of all SMEs in the EU perceive no limitations in 
their access to future financing. To complement bank financing, the CMU 
Action Plan seeks to strengthen the different sources of alternative finance, 
including crowdfunding”); for 75 %, see European Commission (EC), 
Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, supra note 9, at 7. 
18
  See European Commission (EC)  — Action Plan on Building a Capital 
Markets Union, supra note 9; Capital Markets Union: First Status Report, 
SWD 147 final (April 25, 2016) and subsequently SWD 154 final (2016), 
supra note 2. 
19
  Tomboc, supra note 7, at 256 et seq. 
20
  Id. at 256. 
21
  Hurt, supra note 7, at 224; Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 561 et seq.; Heminway 
supra note 8, at 832. 
22
  Eleanor Kirby & Shane Worner, Crowd-funding: An Infant Industry 
Growing Fast (IOSCO Research Department, Staff Working Paper, SWP 
3/2014), 21 et seq. available at 
http://www.iosco.org/research/pdf/swp/Crowd-funding-An-Infant-Industry-
Growing-Fast.pdf; Baumann, supra note 10, at 44 et seq.; Tomboc, supra 
note 7, at 259-260; Michael Nietsch & Nicolas Eberle, Bankaufsichts- und 
prospektrechtliche Fragen typischer Crowdfunding-Modelle, 1788, 1789, 
DB (2014); EC, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, supra 
note 9, at 4, 5 and 7; Report A8-0222/2016 of the European Parliament on 
Access to Finance for SMEs and Increasing the Diversity of SME Funding 
in a Capital Markets Union, at 14 (June 29, 2016). 
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crowdfunding creates new investment opportunities while at the 
same time spreading the risk among a target group of investors 
that may otherwise have been reluctant to invest. The bridging 
of these financing gaps is in the interest of the overall economy. 
Given that small- and medium-sized enterprises provide the 
majority of jobs and innovation, crowdfunding may foster 
growth in the European economy.23  
Crowdfunding subjects the business concept to a ‘crowd test’. 
An entrepreneur needs to ‘sell’ their idea to a crowd of 
financiers. Certain intuitive ideas that may be hard to sell to 
professional investors may find support from the crowd. This is 
particularly true for consumer-related projects with a strong 
emotional appeal, or for those whose appeal is limited to 
particular peer groups. 
From an investor’s point of view, crowdfunding may serve as a 
new tool for diversification. If the administration costs of a 
virtual platform are lower than those of traditional forms of 
financing, crowdfunding may also reduce the financing costs of 
the borrower. If the crowdfunding investor is shareholder in the 
crowdfunded entity, they may receive increased investment 
returns. Further, higher competition among crowdfunding 
providers may unlock innovation and lower costs, and may also 
promote increased efficiency among traditional finance 
providers.24 
With regard to new business, we note a divide between private 
and public returns: Most start-ups fail, leaving seed financiers 
out of pocket. However, even businesses that fail provide some 
benefit to society, through the knowledge generated, jobs created 
and social security levies paid for a certain period of time. 
Regulators around the world thus seek to promote the 
establishment of new businesses.  
  
2. Objectives of financial law 
The imposition of financial law, in general, is justified by 
investor protection, market function and stakeholder concerns.25 
                                                          
23
  EC, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, supra note 9, at 
Introduction, 4 and 7; Also fostering economy in general, see Kirby & 
Worner, supra note 22, at 21 et seq. 
24
  Kirby & Worner, supra note 22, at 22; EC, Action Plan on Building a 
Capital Markets Union, supra note 9, at Introduction and 4. 
25
  Zetzsche, in THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET IN TRANSITION, 
supra note 15, at 343. 
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a) Investor protection 
If investor protection concerns justify regulation of 
crowdfunding, this could increase the attraction of a particular 
location for FinTech operations.26  
(1) Investment, information and agency risk 
While all investors hope that crowdfunding might kick-start a 
significant innovation, in most cases it will lead to a financial 
loss for the crowdfunders.27 From an investor’s or funder’s 
perspective, all financial contracts suffer from inherent 
uncertainty, potential opportunism and agency costs.28 Funders 
expecting rewards and returns face investment risk, information 
asymmetries29 and agency risk in the form of possible fraud,30 
negligence or incompetence on the part of both the platform 
provider and the entrepreneur. Many crowdfunded investments 
to date lack liquidity31; investors may not necessarily be able to 
sell them in liquid secondary markets.32 This is in addition to any 
risk created by the investment’s legal structure. For instance, 
crowdfunding investors could find their investment and 
influence on the entrepreneur becomes diluted by the entry of 
                                                          
26
  See, from a bird’s eye perspective Mark Fendrick, Joseph A McCahery, Erik 
P.M. Vermeulen, Fintech and the Financing of Entrepreneurs: From 
Crowdfunding to Marketplace Lending 31-34 (May 12, 2017). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2967891 (last accessed 29 May 2017). 
27
  Klöhn, Hornuf & Schilling, supra note 2, at 58 (listing 22 insolvency cases 
while only in 4 cases investors were offered a premature exit at a premium 
to their entry price for the German Market). See SWD 154 final (2016), 
supra note 2 at 15-16.  
28
  Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003). 
29
  Aurélie Sannajust, Fabien Roux & Anissa Chaibi, Crowdfunding In France: 
A New Revolution?, 30 J. APP. BUS. RES. 6, 1919, 1923 (2014). 
30
  See Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, supra note 7 at 76 
et.seq (2014). 
31
  See also Anja Hagedorn and Andreas Pinkwart, The Financing Process of 
Equity-Based Crowdfunding: An Empirical Analysis, in 
CROWDFUNDING IN EUROPE: STATE OF THE ART IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 71 (Brüntje and Gajda, eds., 2016). 
32
  See also ESMA, supra note 3, at 11; The European Commission, 
Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets Union, supra note 2, at 14 
(describing some concepts of emerging yet illiquid secondary markets). 
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additional investors.33 Also, platforms34 or entrepreneurs35 may 
prove economically unviable and may file for insolvency.  
The risks are exacerbated by the fact that crowdfunding is used 
by start-ups and emerging SME businesses.36 The associated 
investment risk, level of information asymmetry and uncertainty 
regarding the viability of a project (for example an emerging 
technology) are all significant.37 Also, the most promising start-
ups may receive funding from other sources, such as venture 
capital funds or corporate incubators, leaving second-best 
investments for crowdfunders.38 Finally, transferability of 
acquired rights is limited.39 These risks are nevertheless not 
unique to crowdfunding, and have justified regulatory 
                                                          
33
  See also EC, Consultation Document — Crowdfunding in the EU- 
Exploring the Added Value of Potential EU Action, at 7 et seq. (Oct. 3, 
2013); See also ESMA, supra note 3, at 11 and Michael B. Dorff, The Siren 
Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 516 (2013-2014).  
34
  Examples of platforms that went insolvent include Emphas.is with a debt 
load exceeding 300,000 BPD available at 
https://insolvencyguardian.com.au/blog-view/crowdfunding-platform-
emphasis-goes-insolvent-490580/ . 
35
  See for instance the list of insolvencies o crowdfunded German businesses 
available at http://crowd-investment.de/crowd-pleiten/ (last visited May 14, 
2017); A series of high profile insolvencies has prompted the call for 
adequate regulation in England, see the letter by the Chairman of the 
Treasury Committee Andrew Thiery to Tracey Mc Dermott, head of the 
Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’), of 1 June 2016, available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/treasury/01062016-Chairman-to%20FCA.pdf (last visited May 
14, 2017); In turn, the FCA warns on its website “Due to the potential for 
capital losses, we regard investment-based crowdfunding in particular to be 
a high-risk investment activity. ... It is very likely that you will lose all your 
money. Most investments are in shares or debt securities in start-up 
companies and will often result in a 100% loss of capital as most start-up 
businesses fail. ” available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/crowdfunding pdf (last visited May 14, 
2017); More and more regulators worldwide recognize the necessity to 
require intermediaries to pursue bankruptcy checks on issuers, see ASIC, 
Crowd Sourced Equity Funding Report May 2014, available at 
http://www.tresscox.com.au/icms_docs/266454_crowd-sourced-equity-
funding-report-2014.pdf (last visited May 14, 2017). 
36
  International Organization of Securities Commissions on IOSCO Research 
Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech), at 11, (Feb. 2017), available at  
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf. 
37
  See also ESMA, supra note 3, at 8, ¶18 et seq.; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 
supra note 7, at 6; Nietsch & Eberle, supra note 22, at 1789; Fink, supra 
note 8, at 16; Kirby & Worner, supra note 22, at 45 et seq.; Ibrahim, supra 
note 7, at 573; on information asymmetry in the SME context, see Gilson, 
supra note 26, at 1077.  
38
  Nietsch & Eberle, supra note 22, at 1789. 
39
  ESMA, supra note 3, at 8, ¶19; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, supra note 7, at 
6; Agrawal, Catalini & Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 68.  
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intervention in other cases. So why not regulate crowdfunding in 
a similar manner?  
(2) The ‘crowd’ as false friend  
Promoters of unregulated crowdfunding refer to the mechanics 
of the internet: Social media elements in the funding process 
should facilitate the flow of information between the respective 
sources of supply and demand. A greater sense of engagement 
and participation40 may reduce transaction costs. Social media 
may also facilitate funder education, and exchanges of 
information regarding lessons learned could take place rapidly. 
In turn, the theory of collective intelligence suggests that 
regulators should not ‘police the crowd,’ the crowd is able to 
fend for itself.41  
However, a closer look reveals the crowd to be a false friend. 
Insights from behavioural finance contradict the notion of the 
crowd’s wisdom: Crowds may act irrationally, exhibiting 
‘lemming-like’ behaviour42. Evidence from existing platforms 
indicates the incidence of herding.43 Specifically, investors are 
found to be overoptimistic.44 The quality of social media 
information is also uncertain, as its impact value can be watered 
down by biased comments, and its distribution is for the most 
part erratic. The same is true for comments and discussion as 
innovative features of a crowdfunding platform. Investors seem 
to be influenced by supposed fellow investors, who comment 
positively on the platform.45 Funders are more likely to invest in 
projects that have reached a high percentage of the funding 
goal.46 Crowdfunders may fund projects based on emotion or 
personal preferences; with the profitability and success 
                                                          
40
  European Commission on Consultation Document: Crowdfunding in the 
EU- Exploring the Added Value of Potential EU Action, at 7 (Oct. 3, 2013) 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/consultati
on-document_en.pdf. 
41
  Fink, supra note 8, at 31. 
42
  Heminway, supra note 8, at 837. 
43
  The later funders’ decision may rely on the decision and characteristics of 
early funders, See Paul Belleflamme, Nessrine Omrani & Martin Peitz, The 
Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms, at 32 et seq. (Center for Operations 
Research and Econometrics (CORE), 15 Discussion Paper, 2015) available 
at 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Paul_Belleflamme/publication/273850
822_The_Economics_of_Crowdfunding_Platforms/links/5513f4270cf283ee
08349a36.pdf. 
44
  Agrawal, Catalini & Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 66. 
45
  Hornuf & Schwienbacher, supra note 7, at 11 et seq.; Fink, supra note 8, at 
31. 
46
  Agrawal, Catalini & Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 66; also Hornuf & 
Schwienbacher, supra note 7, at 12; Tomboc, supra note 7, at 269. 
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probability of the funded project relegated to secondary 
importance.47 Also, funders may overestimate the level of due 
diligence conducted by the platform. The platform’s appearance 
may instil an unwarranted level of trust by investors.48 
Data suggest that the use of information by funders is most likely 
irrational. The crowd is constituted by what financial regulation 
refers to as ‘the public’: a high number of non-professional retail 
investors. Via online channels, platforms are able to reach a new 
clientele not tapped by the financial services industry thus far, 
namely young professionals with a high affinity towards 
technology and generally limited investment experience.49 
Investors usually do not leave their homes to invest and tend to 
receive no advice prior to investment. It is doubtful that this 
crowd of ‘couchfunders’ is able to undertake the neutral 
processing and valuation of information that a diligent credit or 
investment decision requires.50 For the most part, funders lack 
basic experience with venture capital financing and the funded 
technologies.51 Even with neutral information in their hands, few 
will be able to draw correct conclusions. Even if they are, lock-
in effects could force them to readjust their preferences. Some of 
these effects may be instilled by the crowd (or some of its 
members). Investors finding themselves locked into an unviable 
investment may try to maintain its value by talking it up on social 
media so that other crowdfunders inject further funds at 
unjustified pricing levels.  
With regard to the traditional distribution of financial 
instruments, the phenomenon of talking up investments is well 
known within, and is addressed by, financial law. For instance, 
for publicly traded assets, Article 14 and Annex I Market Abuse 
Regulation 2014/596/EU prohibit market manipulation by virtue 
of inadequate information being distributed to the public. 
Conflict of interest rules imposed by the Market in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), the Directive on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) and the Directive on 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities (UCITD) prevent asset and fund managers from 
talking up, front running, and dumping assets into funds they 
                                                          
47
  Agrawal, Catalini & Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 68; Nietsch & Eberle, supra 
note 22 at 1789. 
48
  See also ESMA, supra note 3, at 11; discussing the potential civil law 
consequences; see Nietsch & Eberle, supra note 22 at 1792 et seq. 
49
  Heminway, supra note 8, at 832; Hazen, supra note 8, at 1766; also Fink, 
supra note 8, at 8, 31 (finding that crowdfunders stem from various social 
groups, are very heterogeneous and not necessarily acquainted to the world 
of venture capital and risky investments). 
50
  Sceptical also Tomboc, supra note 7, at 268; Hazen, supra note 8, at 1737; 
Nietsch & Eberle, supra note 22 at 1789. 
51
  Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 574 et seq.  
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manage52 – an action which is similar to the fund platform selling 
unsuccessful business models to the crowd. If crowdfunding is 
out of scope of financial law, potential funders are left 
vulnerable.  
In short, the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ proposition is similar to 
libertarian theory, which holds that markets are most effective 
without any regulatory intervention. From an investor protection 
perspective, the call for unregulated crowdfunding based on the 
intelligence of the crowd sounds like a proposed revival of the 
laissez faire approach of the 1920s. If the libertarian theory held 
true, we could forego all financial regulation. However, 
regulators have taken a different view as almost 100 years of 
financial regulation demonstrate.53 
b) Systemic risk prevention 
Presently, the overall financing volume of crowdfunding 
platforms is low.54 Applying the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) 
rationale, we have little reason to regulate. Further, if primarily 
retail investors participate in crowdfunding, the ‘too-connected-
to-fail’ rationale does not justify regulation of crowdfunding. 
However, the institutionalisation of crowdfunding is an 
emerging trend. Data gathered by the European Commission 
indicates increasing professional investment in crowdfunded 
assets.55 Over the past few years, crowdfunding has attracted a 
rising number of institutional investors, either as funders or as 
direct investors in crowdfunding platforms.56 Under the 
                                                          
52  See Article 23 MiFID II, Article 12.1(b) UCITSD as well as Article 12.1(d) 
AIFMD. 
53
  For example the peer-to-peer lending, where crowdfunding provides only 
0,02 % of the bank originated credit, see Kirby & Worner, supra note 22, at 
33.  
54
  We only state here that the rationale of financial law applies. This does not 
exclude that some rules are superfluous or too burdensome, but this is a 
question of which financial law applies to which conduct. 
55
  See European Commission, Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets 
Union, supra note 2, at 13 (“A growing trend that is expected to become 
more prominent in the future is the institutionalisation of crowdfunding, 
notably in terms of the investors. This trend is supported by a recent study 
which found that 45% of platforms in the United Kingdom reported 
institutional involvement, compared to 28% in 2014 and just 11% in 2013. 
Institutional involvement is particularly strong in consumer loans 
crowdfunding, while in equity-based crowdfunding a growing number of 
venture capital and angel investors are co-investing alongside or in parallel 
with ‘crowd investors'. The 'institutional investor' category is quite broad 
and includes banks, mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, asset 
management companies, but also local authorities and national development 
banks.”).  
56
  See Report of Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance in partnership with 
KPMG and CME Group Foundation on Sustaining Momentum, The 2nd 
European Alternative Finance Industry Report, at 20 and 41 (September 
2016) available at 
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assumption of transparency, these investors may be able to 
protect themselves. However, the more active professional 
investors become in this market, the more the TCTF rationale 
justifies regulation.  
In addition, given the current growth rate of crowdfunding57 the 
TBTF objective may justify regulation in the near future.  
Finally, crowdfunding platforms compete with heavily regulated 
intermediaries. Regulation imposes costs. Intermediaries 
without regulation can grow faster than regulated ones, as they 
have a larger share of their returns available for growth rather for 
maintenance of their businesses. At the same time, the level of 
protection provided to retail funders is low. All in all, the 
position of regulated ‘well-governed’ intermediaries and their 
regulators is weakened as business is shifted to unregulated 
entities.58 Even worse, without any regulation in place, 
regulators are unable to observe transaction volumes and the 
trading conduct of crowdfunding platforms.59 Money laundering 
                                                          
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/nl/pdf/2016/sector/financial-
services/sustaining-momentum-the-2nd-european-alternative-finance-
industry-report.pdf  (“Institutionalisation took oﬀ in mainland Europe in 
2015 with 26% of peer-to-peer consumer lending and 24% of peer-to-peer 
business lending funded by institutions such as pension funds, mutual funds, 
asset management firms and banks. 8% of the investment in equity-based 
crowdfunding was also funded by institutional investors such as venture 
capital firms, angels, family oﬃces or funds. Excluding the UK, 44% of the 
surveyed European platforms reported some level of institutional funding in 
2015 and just under 30% of peer-to-peer consumer lending platforms 
reported having a majority institutional shareholder (e.g. a VC, corporate or 
a bank)”). 
57
  Id. at 20 (finding that in 2015 the European online alternative finance 
market - including inter alia crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending -, grew 
by 92%); Kirby & Worner, supra note 22, at 35 et seq. (estimating that peer-
to-peer lending could reach up to $70 billion until 2019); European 
Commission, Crowdfunding: Mapping EU Markets and Events Study, at 75 
(Sept. 30, 2015) (speaking of a rapidly evolving crowdfunding market in the 
EU). 
58
  The same argument applies to other ‘digital’ business models that target 
financial services markets. See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas 
W. Arner & Janos Nathan Barberis, From FinTech to TechFin: The 
Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance (European Banking Institute 
Working Paper Series No. 6, 2017) available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959925.  
59
  This is the difference between debt funds and crowdfunding platforms. Debt 
funds are subject to European regulation (Directive 2011/61/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers, hereafter “AIFMD”). European regulators and 
ESMA in particular have insight into and may interfere in the debt fund 
market. They cannot interfere in the crowdfunding markets. 
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may also be a concern,60 as crowdfunding could well be a form 
of ‘shadow funding.’ 
c) Stakeholder protection 
In European financial law, stakeholder concerns relating to the 
protection of SMEs have been used as a justification for 
regulation.61 These concerns apply to crowdfunding as well. For 
instance, several target companies have had to share their 
intellectual property with a platform provider as a pre-condition 
for funding, or have had to enter into onerous contracts that 
potentially hamper the SME’s future growth.62 Upon the 
platform provider’s insolvency, entrepreneurs could find 
themselves in a difficult position if the platform has diverted 
investors’ funds63 or if the start-up is otherwise entangled in the 
platform’s insolvency. Disentangling the relationship between 
an insolvent platform and an SME may be costlier than the SME 
may be able to afford.  
An SME’s dependency on a platform may also be a reason for 
concern. In essence, the platform functions as the SME’s sole 
investment bank. The platform provider may impose its own fee-
driven interests upon the firm. For instance, it could press the 
SME to acquire another firm funded by the platform, or forego 
business opportunities taken up by other platform-funded firms, 
or make additional funding dependent on egregious fees. Again, 
all of this is not new. Financial law deals with these issues in 
various ways, including takeover, fair dealing and conflict of 
interest rules. Conflict of interest rules require intermediaries to 
avoid conflicts in the first place, or to manage conflicting 
interests with regard to the interests of all parties concerned. 
While some regulators have imposed mandatory rules on 
crowdfunding platforms64with these objectives in mind, we are 
                                                          
60
  See European Commission, Unleashing the Potential of Crowdfunding in 
the European Union, supra note 9, at 5.  
61
  See on the stakeholder orientation of European financial law, Dirk A. 
Zetzsche, in THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET IN TRANSITION, 
supra note 15, at 339 (citing arts 25 et seq. AIFMD as example). 
62
  See Garry. A Gabison, Understanding Crowdfunding and Its Regulation: 
How Can Crowdfunding Help ICT Innovation? (European Commission, 
Joint Research Centre Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, JRC 
Science and Policy Report 16, 2015), available at 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC92482/lbna2699
2enn.pdf; Tomboc, supra note 7, at 268. 
63
  Tomboc, supra note 7, at 268 et.seq.  
64
  See ASIC, supra note 33, at 21 et seq. (detailing the approaches of the UK, 
New Zealand, Canada and the U.S. on conflicts of interests). Under the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001, as amended by the Australian 
Corporations Amendment (Crowd-sourced Funding) Act 2017 (No 
17/2017), the conflicts rules applicable to financial intermediaries apply to 
crowdfunding responsible intermediaries.; IOSCO, Research Report on 
Financial Technologies (Fintech), supra note 34, at 31 § 3.4.(i) 2. IOSCO 
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not aware of a similar market standard in the crowdfunding 
world.  
3. Promoting a Single Market for crowdfunding 
The European Union was established as an economic union 
under the premise of a free, borderless, single market. The Treaty 
of the Functioning of the European Union (one pillar of the EU’s 
‘constitution’) defines integration into a single market as the 
main goal of EU policy.65 In contrast, although the internet is 
international in nature and crowdfunding platforms may be 
accessed from all around the world, crowdfunding platforms 
operate for the most part from the UK, followed by France and 
Germany,66 and most of the time focus on projects located in 
their home country. Cross-border crowdfunding where a 
platform and funded project each reside in different EU/EEA 
Member States is rare, amounting to just 7.3% of the amount 
raised in 2014.67 Cross-border equity crowdfunding is even more 
limited, accounting for only EUR1.8m out of a total EUR104.8m 
in 2014 (< 1,3%).68 However, in a truly European crowdfunding 
market, not only shall the investment side of crowdfunding, but 
the investors as well shall be spread across borders. Due to the 
nature of crowdfunding as an internet phenomenon, this should 
be the easiest of exercises. And yet, cross-border fund raising is 
still hampered by additional legal69 and tax barriers. In 
particular, crowdfunding takes different legal forms and is 
subject to different regulation in various EU/EEA member 
states.  
Platform providers are burdened with a plethora of additional 
rules when crossing borders. Divergent rules on crowdfunding 
in member states unsurprisingly hamper rather than promote 
cross border activity.70 While a lot of market participants wish to 
cross borders, they are being deterred by a lack of information 
about applicable rules and high costs of multiple authorisations 
                                                          
emphasizes risks regarding to retail trading over investment platforms, in 
particular risks resulting from conflicts of interest and insufficient cost and 
fee transparency. 
65
  Cf. Art. 26 TFEU, O.J. (C326) 1-390 of 26 October 2012. 
66
  510 crowdfunding platforms were active in the EU in 2014, 8 of them being 
non-EU platforms, see European Commission (EC) on Crowdfunding: 
Mapping EU Markets and Events Study, supra note 54, at 21 et seq. 
67
  European Commission (EC) on Crowdfunding: Mapping EU Markets and 
Events Study, supra note 54, at 29. 
68
  Id. at 40. 
69
  See European Commission, Communication, supra note 57, at 5 et seq. 9 
(mentioning the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms, IP law and the Anti-
Money Laundering legislation).  
70
  See European Commission, Crowdfunding: Mapping EU Markets and 
Events Study, supra note 54, at 75. 
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in different member states.71 In particular for platforms from 
smaller countries, cross-border access is vital, both in terms of 
projects and funding. In order to establish a truly European 
capital market and strengthen alternative sources of finance for 
SMEs72, facilitation of cross-border SME financing is crucial.  
The regulatory objective in facilitating a single market is 
different from the respective perspective of investors, the 
financial system and stakeholder protection. While the former 
justifies restrictions, the promotion of a single crowdfunding 
market justifies some liberation. The prevailing method of 
facilitating single market access in financial law is, however, the 
European passport. The European passporting system is built on 
the presumption that the passported activity is at its core a 
regulated activity, which means a license is necessary prior to 
taking up the activity in the entity’s home market. The license is 
issued subject to several preconditions, which we discuss in the 
next section. However, one aspect is noteworthy. Without 
regulation, the Member States where the financial services are 
distributed (i.e. where the funders reside) bear the risks while the 
benefits accrue to the intermediary’s home Member State. Risk 
asymmetry over time is unbearable for the distribution states. In 
turn, minimum harmonization aimed at a suitable level of 
protection for the host Member States’ investors, financial 
systems and stakeholders is a precondition for providing any 
financial services across borders.73 This rationale applies in 
particular to the regulation of crowdfunding. 
III. Towards platform regulation 
Several policy bodies have promoted crowdfunding regulation 
in Europe. In particular, the ESMA has identified six key 
components of a suitable regulatory approach to 
crowdfunding.74 These components are: 
• Safeguards to ensure operational continuity, such as a 
minimum capital level proportionate to the platform’s 
business model; 
• A mechanism to ensure the appropriateness of the 
instruments offered to investors;  
                                                          
71
  European Commission, Communication, supra note 57, at 8.  
72
  European Commission, Communication on Action Plan on Building a 
Capital Markets Union, supra note 9. 
73
  For a detailed discussion see Dirk A. Zetzsche, Competitiveness of 
Financial Centers in Light of Financial and Tax Law Equivalence 
Requirements, in RETHINKING GLOBAL FINANCIAL LAW AND ITS 
REGULATION 390-418 (R. Buckley, D. Arner & E. Avgouleas eds., 
2016); Dirk A. Zetzsche, The Anatomy of European Investment Fund Law, 
supra note 15, at III.2; Douglas W. Arner & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Cross-
Border Financial Services – The Example of Investment Funds – 
forthcoming. 
74
  ESMA, supra note 3, at 11 et seq. 
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• A mechanism to ensure that investors are aware of the 
associated risks; 
• Segregation of client assets in case of platform 
insolvency; 
• Rules concerning the governance of the platform, inter 
alia business continuity provisions and safeguards 
against conflict of interests; and  
• Clear rules, and perhaps communication requirements, 
regarding the platform’s responsibilities and 
accountability to the client.  
Particularly geared to the needs of the industry are the proposals 
of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (ECON). Regarding the exclusion of offerings 
less than EUR 1 million from the prospectus requirements, the 
ECON states that “a minimum level of consumer protection” 
should be granted through risk warnings and basic disclosure, 
“basic organisational requirements”, cancellation rights and caps 
on the investment amount.75  
Given the plethora of financial legislation since the GFC, both 
wish lists prompt the question of whether special legislation for 
crowdfunding is warranted, or whether we can deal with 
crowdfunding using the established tools of financial law. We 
find the answer in the legal diversity of crowdfunding. 
Crowdfunding is a real-world phenomenon that can take on 
different legal forms. For instance, crowd-sourced equity 
platforms76 facilitate investors acquiring stakes in small 
businesses with innovative business ideas. These stakes can have 
any legal form, ranging from simple contractual return promises 
of an unspecified kind, to securities, limited partnerships, debt 
instruments or a combination of the these.77  
From a regulatory perspective, the variety is difficult to handle. 
European financial law78 draws on ‘boxes’ such as securities 
                                                          
75
  Report A8-0238/2016 of the European Parliament on the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus 
to be Published When Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to 
Trading, Amendment 5, Article 15 (July 19, 2016). 
76
  European Commission, Crowdfunding: Mapping EU Markets and Events 
Study, supra note 54, at 23 (Sept. 30, 2015); Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 
supra note 7, at 5; Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 569. 
77
  See on the use of mezzanine for Germany, Hornuf & Schwienbacher, supra 
note 7, at 6. 
78
  In addition to financial markets law rules on the digital single market may 
apply, which are not subject to our considerations, see Directive 2000/31/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market. Also Anti-money laundering provisions 
may apply see Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 20 May 2015 on The Prevention of the Use of the Financial 
System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing 
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(Prospectus Directive79), financial instruments (MiFID 
II/MiFIR80), undertakings for collective investments (UCITSD, 
AIFMD)81 and the provision of credit (CRD IV/CRR82). For 
legal certainty, these boxes are narrowly defined. If one of the 
defining characteristics is missing, European financial law will 
not apply. For instance, the provider of a peer-to-peer-lending 
platform will not provide credit as this necessitates lending 
against the entity’s balance sheet. Accordingly, the platform is 
not a credit institution for the purposes of European banking law. 
Since the platform does not pool the capital provided by lenders 
it is out of scope for European collective investment law. The 
provider of an investment platform that avoids the investment 
characteristics of financial instruments is out of scope of MiFID 
II/MiFIR, etc.  
This situation gives cause for concern. Funders, either investors 
or lenders, typically expect a return on their investment. Hence, 
investor protection concerns are paramount. Moreover, the 
regulatory provisions are sometimes applied differently between 
Member States. For instance, the traditional German view 
deemed long established participation in limited partnerships to 
be out of scope of MiFID, while these arrangements were 
deemed financial instruments in Luxembourg. The resulting 
ambiguity leads to frictions in a cross-border setting. If the 
regulatory status is uncertain, crowdfunding platforms are 
                                                          
79
  See Art. 3 and 14 Directive 2003/71/EC on The Prospectus to be Published 
When Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC, O.J. (L345) 64, as amended. 
80
  See Art. 4.1(8) Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments (…) (‘MiFID 
II’): ‘portfolio management’ means managing portfolios in accordance with 
mandates given by clients on a discretionary client-by-client basis where 
such portfolios include one or more financial instruments. 
81
  Cf. Art. 1(1) Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 on The Coordination of Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITSD); Art. 4(1)(a) AIFMD; Art. 
4(1) Regulation (EU) 2015/760 on European Long-term Investment Funds 
(ELTIFR); Art. 3(a) of the Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of on European Venture Capital Funds 
(EuVECAR), and Art. 3(a) of the Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on European Social 
Entrepreneurship Funds (EuSEFR). For a detailed discussion see Zetzsche, 
Anatomy of European Investment Funds Law, supra note 15, at V.1. 
82
  See Art. 2 and 3 Council Directive 2013/36 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit 
Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and 
Investment Firms (CRD IV), 2013 O.J. (L176) 338; Art. 4(1) No. 1 
Commission Regulation 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions 
and Investment Firms (CRR), O.J. (L176) 1. 
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reluctant to take on the costs and risks of going across the 
border.83  
In the following section, we discuss the options available for a 
cross-border crowdfunding passport, following the traditional 
regulatory categories of product, sales and manager/ 
intermediary regulation.  
1. Product regulation 
a) Definition 
Product regulation is predicated on a tight product definition. 
The law prescribes the legal characteristics of the investment 
product which is subject to authorisation. These characteristics 
together make sure that the risks for investors from the financial 
product are mitigated to an extent that investors are willingly 
ready to bear. Product regulation seeks to abolish all risks other 
than investment risk, for which investors are compensated. In 
practice, product rules rarely achieve this objective.  
b) Example 
The UCITSD is the most successful example of product 
regulation. Pursuant to Art. 5 (1) UCITSD, “[n]o UCITS shall 
pursue activities as such unless it has been authorised in 
accordance with” the UCITSD. The authorisation is contingent 
on the fund document’s compliance with the UCITS investment 
restrictions, transparency requirements and general obligations, 
the appointment of a licensed UCITS fund management 
company, the appointment of a licensed depository and the 
directors of the depository being of sufficiently good repute and 
experience in relation to the type of UCITS.84  
The UCITS investment restrictions relate to the core of the 
UCITS product. The UCITS investment strategy specified in 
Art. 50 – 57 UCITSD focuses on liquid assets due to its open-
ended nature, i.e. investors can redeem their investment at any 
time during the life of the UCITS. The UCITSD seeks to achieve 
liquidity of the UCITS assets with an extensive list of underlying 
assets in Article 50 (1) UCITSD, which by their nature are 
deemed liquid. These underlying assets range from transferable 
securities issued in respect of money market funds traded on 
capital markets, to more exotic assets such as untraded money 
market instruments backed by (1) public institutions, (2) listed 
companies, (3) prudentially regulated institutions, or entities 
                                                          
83
  European Commission Summary on Responses to the Public Consultation 
on Crowdfunding in the EU, at 4 (March 2014) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/summary
-of-responses_en.pdf (mentioning lack of information about foreign legal 
requirements and high costs of authorisation on other EU member states as 
barriers to cross-border crowdfunding). 
84
  Art. 5(2) and (4) UCITSD. 
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with a minimum capital of EUR10m, including the financing 
divisions of listed companies or banks, that provide a minimum 
level of investor protection subject to approval by national 
authorities (Art. 50 (1)(h) UCITSD). Further, Article 50 (2) 
UCITSD prohibits the acquisition of precious metals, or 
certificates representing them, and real estate for investment 
purposes.85  
c) Discussion 
An advantage of production regulation is the legal certainty 
stemming from stringent product rules. Investors know what 
risks they are taking on, and can manage these accordingly. On 
the downside, product regulation is not open to innovation but is 
particularly open to circumvention. By slightly altering the 
product range and definition, intermediaries find themselves out 
of scope. For these reasons, the UCITSD I, Europe’s most 
successful investment product, has been supplemented with 
regulation of the fund management company. Also, its rigid 
product rules relating to securities traded in public markets have 
been widened and deepened down to include investment 
strategies such as ETFs, 130:30 portfolios and complex UCITS.  
The example of the UCITSD is a strong argument that product 
rules may function as signal to investors, but may need to be 
supplemented by manager regulation. However, in the case of 
crowdfunding, the product is not clearly defined. Crowdfunding 
could refer to a donation, a debt, an investment, or a combination 
of each.86 More importantly than the form of the investment, the 
underlying business model is far from uniform. Business ideas 
range from simple to sophisticated technology. The only 
common denominator is that investors encounter the business via 
internet. This is insufficient to draft product regulation for 
crowdfunding.  
2. Sales / Distribution regulation 
a) Definition 
The legal focus of sales regulation is the point of sale or 
distribution, i.e. contact with the client. Sales regulation can take 
one of two forms. Either it may seek to ensure that investors are 
informed in a standardised way via a prospectus or key investor 
document (type 1 rules, or disclosure approach), or it may seek 
to ensure that investors have access only to products suitable for 
them. In the latter case, the financial intermediary functions as a 
gatekeeper. Rather than offering all products to the investor, the 
intermediary filters the investment universe and distinguishes 
                                                          
85
  For a detailed overview see Zetzsche, The Anatomy of European Investment 
Fund Law, supra note 15, at VI. 
86
  See EC, Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets Union, supra note 2, at 8 
et seq. 
 22
between suitable from unsuitable products (type 2 rules, or KYC 
approach). Type 1 or type 2 rules may be supplemented by type 
3 rules that restrict the nominal amounts investors may invest.  
b) Examples 
Type 1 (disclosure): PD and PRIIPSR 
The PD87 facilitates the raising of capital in a cross-border 
context. It does so by imposing a common standard, in return 
providing a single passport for cross-border offerings. Whenever 
securities are offered to the public or traded on a regulated 
market, a prospectus must be drawn up and published after being 
approved by the NCA.88 Based on this approval, the securities 
may be offered publicly in all member states. The PD determines 
the content and form of the prospectus and regulates what 
information investors need in order to make a sound investment 
decision. The PD thus provides reliable minimum standards for 
investors, as well as legal certainty and a level-playing field for 
issuers. 
The regulatory goal is investor protection through the provision 
of information, as well as protection of the proper functioning of 
the financial markets by maintaining investor confidence. A 
prospectus should enable investors to understand their rights and 
to assess the risks associated with a security and thus make 
informed decisions.89 The issuer, guarantor or party seeking 
admission to trading is responsible for the information that must 
be specified in the prospectus.90 
The PD covers all kinds of transferable securities under Art. 1 
(1) and 2 (1) (a) MiFiD. It was not designed to apply in the 
crowdfunding context: (1) Publishing a PD-compliant 
prospectus drawn up for the professional trading of a security in 
capital markets is costly. Including drafting costs, fees of 
external advisers, translation, regulatory fees and auditing fees, 
estimates range between EUR200,000 to EUR300,000.91 (2) The 
complexity of the prospectus is high and seems out of place in 
                                                          
87
  Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are 
offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC; see also Proposal for a Regulation on the prospectus to be 
published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading, 
COM (2015) 583 final (draft PD 2015). 
88
  Art. 3 PD. 
89
  PD, recital 18 et seq.; Art. 5 PD. 
90
  Art. 6 PD. 
91
  Report of Center for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES), Study on the 
Impact of the Prospectus Regime on EU Financial Markets Final Report, 47 
et seq. (June 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/prospectus/cses_report_en.pdf 
(last visited July 14, 2015). 
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the social media influenced crowdfunding. Given the high costs 
and complexity, PD-based regulation is unattractive for 
crowdfunding platforms.92  
Crowdfunding platforms can avoid the application of the PD by 
several means. First, they can tailor the investment such that is 
does not meet the definition of ‘security’. Notably in Germany, 
various methods were developed to an extent that prompted the 
German parliament to add additional prospectus requirements 
for investments that do not meet the securities definition.93 
Second, the obligation to publish a prospectus does not apply if 
the offer is sufficiently small that the drawing up of a costly 
prospectus is disproportionate to the proceeds of the offer. For 
instance, Art. 1 (1) h) exempts a PD from the prospectus 
requirement if the total consideration for the offer stays below 
EUR5m for 12 months.94 In this case the offer is excluded from 
the scope of the PD. However, the EU/EEA Member States may 
impose additional national requirements for offers between 
EUR100,000 and EUR5m for 12 months.95 Currently 17 
Member States make use of that option.96 The recast of the PD 
will raise the respective thresholds even further in order to create 
a safe harbour for crowdfunding initiatives.97  
While one could question the desirability of the prospectus 
exemptions due to the cost-benefit ratio of the PD, we believe 
the non-application of the PD to be of greater importance for the 
viability of a well-functioning crowdfunding market: The 
EUR200,000 to EUR300,000 prospectus cost exceeds the 
average crowdfunding offer size in Europe.98 Such a cost burden 
would make crowdfunding unviable. Further, significant data 
disclosures in a prospectus concern the past while crowdfunding 
                                                          
92
  They try to tailor their business such as to maneuver under and around, see 
ESMA, supra note 3, at 9, ¶22; Klöhn, Hornuf & Schilling, supra note 2 at 
61 et seq. 
93
  Those are detailed in the Gesetz über Vermögensanlagen 
(Vermögensanlagengesetz - VermAnlG). 
94
  According to Art. 1(3) d) draft PD 2015 this threshold will be raised to 10 
mio.  
95
  See however Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston  in ECJ case C-
441/12, No. 38 et seq. (June 19, 2014). According to Art. 3(2) draft PD 2015 
this threshold will be raised to 500 TEUR.  
96
  See draft PD 2015, at 13. 
97
  EC, Commission Staff Working Paper, at 20, SWD 0255 final (2015); Draft 
PD 2015, at 13; European Commission, Crowdfunding: Mapping EU 
Markets and Events Study, supra note 54, at 40; Report on the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Prospectus to be Published When Securities are Offered to the Public or 
Admitted to Trading, supra note 72. 
98
  See European Parliament on Crowdfunding in Europe - Introduction and 
State of Play, at 5 (January 2017) (detailing that average size of investment 
in 2014 amounted to EUR 260,000). 
 24
is all about the future: Emerging enterprises lack the 
sophistication and history to draw up meaningful disclosure, 
including data for back testing and peer group considerations. It 
does not come as a surprise that inside99 and outside100 Europe 
lighter touch offer documents substitute for heavy-handed 
prospectus requirements. We believe the same holds true for 
Europe. 
Type 2 (KYC): MiFID 
Under the type 2 approach, the regulator seeks to ensure that 
investors have access only to products and information suitable 
for them. There are two ways to ensure suitability, either through 
defining suitability in a general and abstract manner and banning 
inexperienced investors from certain products, or through 
delegating the suitability test to the financial intermediary to 
filter the investment universe and single out suitable and 
unsuitable products. For example, a MIFID investment firm 
must conduct a client investigation (know your customer) and 
may only recommend or offer financial instruments that fit the 
specific needs and interests of the client.101 To fulfil the KYC 
rules, the investment firm must obtain information about the 
client’s financial situation, risk tolerance, knowledge and 
investment experience with respect to the targeted product type 
or service and the potential loss associated with the product.102 
Type 3 (investment limits) 
Type 3 rules that set a maximum investment limit per investor 
constitute such a less expensive regulatory tool. Examples of 
type 3 rules include the German Small Investor Protection Act 
                                                          
99  German law requires a short form document pursuant to ss. 13, 14 
VermAnlG. On details see Klöhn, Hornuf & Schilling, supra note 2 at 61 et 
seq. (with a technical critique). 
100  See ASIC, supra note 33, at 21 et seq. (detailing the approaches in New 
Zealand, Canada, and the US.) as well as § 738J et seq. of the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001, as amended by the Australian Corporations 
Amendment (Crowd-sourced Funding) Act 2017 (No 17/2017). IOSCO, 
Research Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech), supra note 34, at 65 
et seq., about FinTech growth in emerging markets/ Asia. The regulatory 
environment for P2P lending platforms and ECF varies considerably across 
emerging markets. Some countries have implemented regulation, while 
others have no tailored regulatory frameworkdue to the still nascent nature 
of these business models and the fact that the full benefits and opportunities, 
as well as the risks and challenges, are not yet fully understood (at 67-68).  
101
  Art. 24 et seq. MIFID II; see Dirk A. Zetzsche & Thomas Marte, AIFMD 
versus MIFIDII/MIFIR: Similarities and Differences, 120 et seq. in THE 
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE: 
EUROPEAN REGULATION OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT 
FUNDS (Dirk A. Zetzsche ed., 2nd ed. 2015). 
102
  Art. 25(2) MiFID II. 
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(2015)103 that limits the amount investors may invest into 
crowdfunding schemes at EUR1,000 per issuer. The amount is 
EUR10,000 if the investors declare total fungible assets of at 
least EUR100,000 or do not invest more than double their 
monthly net income. Type 3 rules apply also in Austria, where 
single investors may invest up to EUR5,000 per issue in any 
twelve-month period, unless they declare that they are not 
investing more than twice their monthly net income or ten 
percent of their financial assets.104 Similar rules are common 
elsewhere within and beyond European borders.105 
c) Discussion 
None of the rules governing distribution are fit for 
crowdfunding. As to type 1 (disclosure) rules, the costs of 
drawing up mandatory disclosure are significant, while the 
willingness of ‘the crowd’ to read and apply the information 
provided to them is cast in doubt. Crowdfunding is characterized 
by a certain degree of irrationality, which is both a weakness and 
a strength. It is a weakness, since disclosure-based investor 
protection does not work in that many crowdfunding investors 
do not regard themselves as investors, but as supporters and 
business angels of innovation. It is a strength, as irrationality, or 
perhaps defiance of convention, creates new business ideas that 
reveal sales potential by catering to people’s emotions. Third, 
foregoing disclosure obligations altogether does not resolve the 
issue of cross-border crowdfunding. This is because without a 
prospectus we lack the basis on which to grant a prospectus 
passport. 
Type 2 (KYC) rules are associated with two issues: cost and 
expertise. Due to cost, most legislators seeking to enable low-
cost crowdfunding have scaled back on KYC requirements. 
Type 2 rules require the platform provider to inquire into the 
knowledge, skills and experience of all retail individuals that 
together constitute ‘the crowd’, even though each funder invests 
                                                          
103
  See § 2a Gesetz über Vermögensanlagen (Vermögensanlagengesetz - 
VermAnlG). 
104
  See § 3 Bundesgesetz über alternative Finanzierungsformen 
(Alternativfinanzierungsgesetz – AltFG), see Roman Rericha & Raphael 
Toman, Neuer Rechtsrahmen für Crowdfunding - Ausbruch aus dem 
Regelungsdickicht des Kapitalmarkts?, ZFR 218, 403 (2015). 
105
  See, for instance, s. 738ZC of the Australian Corporations Act 2001, as 
amended by the Australian Corporations Amendment (Crowd-sourced 
Funding) Act 2017 (No 17/2017) (“The responsible intermediary for a CSF 
offer must reject an application made by a person pursuant to the offer if: 
(a) the person is a retail client in relation to the offer; and (b) having regard 
only to CSF offers for which the intermediary is the responsible 
intermediary, the application would result in the total amount paid or 
payable by the person in respect of applications made by the person, in any 
period of 12 months, pursuant to CSF offers made by the same company, 
exceeding: (i)  $10,000 ...”).  
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very little at one time. From a cost/benefit perspective, such a 
‘per client’ approach is uneconomical and risks foreclosing 
crowdfunding altogether. Regulators who apply KYC checks in 
principle, provide exemptions from appropriateness and 
suitability tests if investors are protected by less expensive 
regulatory tools.106 In Italy, which to our knowledge is the only 
country that has fully applied MiFID-style KYC rules to 
crowdfunding107, a reform is in the making. While costs are 
certain, expertise on the side of platform providers to assess the 
appropriateness of investors is uncertain. Using non-experts as 
gatekeepers makes things worse rather than better. 
As to type 3 (investment limits), any strict investment limit is 
either too high or too low. For poor people, even small amounts 
are too high as these could include all their savings, while at the 
same time restrict the ability of wealthy individuals to support 
innovative enterprises108 and diversify their portfolios. We also 
observe an enforcement issue. Investors can participate in 
multiple platforms. Limiting losses on a possibly well governed 
platform may have a harmful effect if the same investors 
participate in other less well governed platforms. In fact, a 
smaller investment amount per platform could reduce investor 
due diligence and exacerbate the collective action problems 
inherent in crowdfunding.109 Finally, type 3 regulation does not 
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  For instance, while in the UK FCA Policy Statement PS14/4 in theory 
requires an appropriateness assessment of retail clients intermediaries do not 
need to ensure that individuals continue to qualify under that 
appropriateness test on an ongoing basis. In particular, the appropriateness 
test does not apply where retail clients certify that they will not invest more 
than 10% of their net investible assets in non-readily realisable securities; 
further an appropriateness test of the past is valid for 12 months.  
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  See Legislative Decree No. 179 of 19 Oct. 2012, subsequently converted 
into Law No. 221 of 17 Dec. 2012, was implemented by Consob Regulation 
No. 18592 of 26 June 2013 (drawing on MiFID on MiFID for equity based 
crowdfunding models); on details Casimiro A. Nigro & Vittorio Santoro, 
The Quest for Innovative Entrepreneurship and the Italian Regime for 
Equity Crowdfunding, 11 EUR. COMP. L. 229 et seq. (2014); Edoardo 
d’Ippolito, Matteo Musitelli, Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi, Protecting 
Crowdfunders: Is a MiFID-Mimicking Approach Appropriate? 13:1 EUR. 
COMP. L. 27–37 (2016) (referring to the MiFID suitability test as main 
hindrance for the Italian crowdfunding scheme and mentioning reform 
initiatives); IOSCO, Research Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech), 
supra note 34, at 74. 
108
  ESMA states that invested sums can “be substantial”, see ESMA, supra note 
3, at 8, ¶20. 
109
  Consequently, the danger to be defrauded may be higher, see Agrawal, 
Catalini & Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 77; similar consideration with respect 
to US securities regulation, also providing examples see Pesok, supra note 
8, at 149 et seq. 
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prevent fraud which is most harmful to investor confidence, 
irrespective of whether it involves small or large sums.110 
3. ‘Manager’ or Intermediary Approach 
None of the product and sales regulation types of regulation 
provide the basis for a European passport for crowdfunding 
platforms engaged in low-volume SME investments. There are 
two reasons for this. First, cross-border notification per product 
or per sales effort over time is more expensive than one 
notification per platform where the platform has multiple 
products to fund and where funding periods for each product are 
limited to several weeks or months. Second, if European 
regulation focuses on products, Member States could retain 
jurisdiction over manager regulation. There is currently a 
patchwork of harmonised European law in the field of financial 
markets. National gold plating in the case of minimum 
harmonisation as well as national regulation in un-harmonised 
areas of law could prevail. A clear-cut European legal 
framework is of the utmost importance. 
Crowdfunding platforms are intermediaries that bring together 
the supply and demand of capital by providing the infrastructure 
necessary to present the projects, the legal framework for 
investment, as well as ongoing support for both supply and 
demand. Most crowdfunding platforms provide services to 
protect investors, such as screening of projects, information on 
applicable fees, identity checks of project owners, facilitation of 
communication between funders and project owners, and 
information to funders regarding associated risks.111  
At the same time, crowdfunding platforms operate on a for-profit 
basis. While fee structures are not uniform, we find fees are 
similar to the asset management world. Crowdfunding platforms 
charge (1) an initial investment fee, taken prior to channelling 
the investment to meet demand once the overall funding amount 
has reached the minimum investment threshold, (2) an ongoing 
annual ‘management’ fee charged to the user of funds, and /or 
(3) a performance fee dependent on the user’s successful growth 
and exit.112 This may incentivise platforms to increase the 
number of potential entrepreneurs, establish trust amongst 
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  See Hazen, supra note 8 at 1765 (stating that “fraud can come in small 
packages too”). European Commission, Summary, supra note 80, at 6 
(stating that one in four respondents considers the risks of fraud or 
misleading advertising in crowdfunding as too high to even participate); 
ESMA, supra note 3, at 11. 
111
  European Commission, Summary, supra note 80, at 4. 
112
  See Agrawal, Catalini & Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 74 (finding that 
crowdfunding platforms charge an initial fee of 4-5%); a LL.M. master 
thesis at the University of Liechtenstein revealed a larger variety, and 
overall higher costs than Agrawal/Catalini/Goldfarb, see Steib, Costs of 
Crowdfunding and European Law, 2016 (unpublished, on file with authors). 
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investors and limit fraudulent use of the platform.113 On the 
downside, we may see excessive fees similar to those in the asset 
management and fund distribution chain. In the latter case, 
fiduciary risk has materialised. European financial law has 
implemented ‘manager’ regulation to counter the risk that 
intermediaries abuse their fiduciary capacity at a cost to 
investors. 
a) Licensing requirements 
Asset managers and investment advisers are subject to a 
general prohibition under all investment legislation, but which is 
lifted when the manager is authorised by the national competent 
authority.114 The most important licensing requirements115 
include a fit-and-proper test for senior management; minimum 
capital requirements (details vary); a review of the business plan; 
adequate risk controls; an adequate business organisation; 
reliable significant shareholders; reliable third-country 
relationships, if any, and provision for a mandatory withdrawal 
of the license if the intermediary no longer meets the 
requirements of the applicable legislation.116 
The standardisation of operating conditions has gained 
momentum with the European Commission’s statements on the 
governance of financial institutions.117 The most important are 
rules governing managers’ operations118 including commitments 
to fairness, honesty and investors’ best interests; conflicts of 
interest; best execution; the intermediary’s remuneration; the 
prohibition of letter-box entities or shell companies; valuations; 
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  Agrawal, Catalini & Goldfarb, supra note 7, at 74.  
114
  See Arts. 5(1) and 6 UCITSD; art. 6(1) AIFMD; art. 14 EuVeCaR 
(registration); art. 14 EuSEFR (registration); arts. 5, 6 ELTIFR; art. 5(1) 
MMFR draft; art. 5 MiFID II; art. 8 CRD IV. 
115
  See Arts. 6, 7 UCITSD; arts. 6-10 AIFMD; arts. 7-10, 12-14 EuVeCaR; arts. 
7-10, 12-14 EuSEFR; art. 7 ELTIFR (referring to AIFMD); arts. 5, 6 
MMFR draft (referring to UCITSD and AIFMD); art. 9 et seq. MiFID II; 
art. 10 et seq. CRD IV. 
116
  See Arts. 6, 7 UCITSD; arts. 6-10 AIFMD; arts. 7-10, 12-14 EuVeCaR; arts. 
7-10, 12-14 EuSEFR; art. 7 ELTIFR (referring to AIFMD); arts. 5, 6 
MMFR draft (referring to UCITSD and AIFMD). 
117.
  See Paulo Câmara, The AIFM’s Governance and Remuneration Committees, 
at 293 et seq. in THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS 
DIRECTIVE: EUROPEAN REGULATION OF ALTERNATIVE 
INVESTMENT FUNDS (Dirk A. Zetzsche ed., 2nd ed. 2015); EC, 
Commission Staff Working Document: Corporate Governance in Financial 
Institutions: Lessons to be Drawn from the Current Financial Crisis, Best 
Practices; accompanying document to the Green Paper Corporate Governance 
in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies, SEC (2010) 669 (June 2, 
2010). 
118
  See Arts. 10-15 UCITSD, Arts. 12-19 AIFMD; arts. 7, 10-13 EuVeCaR, 
arts. 7, 10-13 EuSEFR; art. 7 ELTIFR (referring to AIFMD); arts. 5, 6 and 
12, 22 MMFR draft. 
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and extensive reporting obligations to NCAs especially with 
regard to the use of securities financing techniques. Also covered 
is the NCA’s power to impose leverage limits or other intervene 
against a product set-up.119  
Modern European risk management rules are driven by 
developments in risk management methodology introduced via 
the banking sector.120 Since cross-sectoral consistency is a stated 
policy goal, we deem the tripartite distinction between 
institutional risk management (risk organisation), operational 
risk management (risk procedures) and quantitative risk 
management (risk measurement) to be a common feature of 
European risk management law.121 Similarly, the substantive 
rules on risk management show remarkable similarities.122 These 
include the types of risks to be considered; upgrading operational 
risk to the same level as financial risk; measurement 
methodologies; risk measurement across sectors that rely on a 
commitment approach, VaR or company-specific models; and 
the imposition of risk limits. 
b) Discussion 
The platform provider is deemed the most efficient focal point 
of regulation.123 Regulating the platform rather than products or 
distribution allows a certain level of proportionality in regulation 
whilst not sacrificing investor protection. Platform regulation 
does not protect investors in a paternalistic way by prohibiting 
them from taking on certain investment risks, but provides them 
with protection from risks such as fraud or negligence. Of 
particular importance are the rules on conflicts of interest which 
prevent platform providers from marketing businesses in which 
they hold significant stakes on a preferred basis with a view to 
flipping or dumping these stakes. All these details can be 
regulated at low cost for the product offering. It does not come 
at a surprise that outside of Europe several countries have 
focused on platform providers. 124 Within the EU, we see a 
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  See Art. 24 AIFMD; art. 39 et seq. MiFIR (product intervention). 
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  See Dirk A. Zetzsche & David Eckner, Risk Management, at 323 et seq. in 
THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE: 
EUROPEAN REGULATION OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT 
FUNDS (Dirk A. Zetzsche ed., 2nd ed. 2015). 
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  Id. Zetzsche & Eckner. 
122
  See Art. 51(1) UCITSD; arts. 15, 16 AIFMD; art. 7 ELTIFR (referring to 
AIFMD) with additional rules in arts. 5(2) and 23(6) ELTFIR; arts. 21-25 
MMFR draft (EuVeCaR and EuSEFR as low key regulation do not provide 
explicitly for risk management). 
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  Klöhn, Hornuf & Schilling, supra note 2, at 65. 
124
  See ASIC, supra note 33, at 21 et seq. (detailing the approaches in New 
Zealand, Canada, and the US.) as well as s. 738C and Chapter 7 of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001, as amended by the Australian 
Corporations Amendment (Crowd-sourced Funding) Act 2017 (No 
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platform-focused approach notably in the UK, but also in the 
Netherlands, Italy, France and Germany.125 
ESMA voices the concern that crowdfunding platforms try to 
circumvent the application of MiFID by making securities non-
transferable. Circumvention of MiFID not only reduces the 
cross-border availability of crowdfunding platforms but also, 
more importantly, the level of investor protection. ESMA urges 
regulators to “reduce the incentive” for circumvention.126 
However, as long as the MiFID framework imposes significant 
costs that could de facto erase crowdfunding in smaller 
countries in particular, national regulators will refrain from 
imposing such legislation. They would face the risk of erecting 
excessively high barriers of entry to the crowdfunding market, 
rendering the market dysfunctional before it even started. Even 
if a passport for the whole of Europe looks more appealing, a 
new approach is of the essence. 
IV.  ‘MiFiD light’ platform regulation: policy 
considerations 
In the preceding section, we established the need for regulation 
of platforms according to the ‘manager’ type of regulation of 
European financial law. At the same time, the MiFID II/MiFIR 
as well as the other fully regulated AIFMD, UCITSD and the 
CRD/CRR framework with regulation-induced fixed costs 
starting at EUR500,000 p.a. are too costly for crowdfunding 
platforms as long as the overall transaction volume per platform 
is low and costs per product are high. While this may change 
with crowdfunding growing into an established way of 
financing, costs and the substance of regulation today will 
influence whether crowdfunding can be established this way – 
with Italy being the most prominent example of how overly strict 
                                                          
17/2017); IOSCO, Research Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech), 
supra note 34, at 68. 
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  See Policy Statement 14/4 of the FCA, The FCA’s Regulatory Approach to 
Crowdfunding over the Internet, and the Promotion of Non-Readily 
Realisable Securities by Other Media Feedback to CP13/13 and Final Rules 
(March 2014). For an overview of implementation in Europe see ESMA, 
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Mapping EU Markets and Events Study, supra note 54, at 63 et seq. See 
also Thierry Bonneau, La régulation du crowdfunding dans le monde, RISF 
2014/2 p 5. 
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  ESMA, supra note 3, at 28. 
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regulation that demands diligence on a per-client basis can slow 
developments.127 
While our proposal looks similar to the Italian MiFID-style 
approach, it is different with regard to the most important 
question which is which of the many MiFID rules do apply. Our 
proposal is inspired by an often overlooked exemption in the 
MiFID framework in Article 4 (1) No. 2 (c) CRR.128 
Rather than the full MiFID model that has limited crowdfunding 
activity in Italy, we suggest developing the ‘MiFID light’ 
exemption of Article 4 (1) No. 2 (c) CRR further to a pan-
European crowdfunding license. We outline in the following 
section how crowdfunding platforms could be regulated with 
little modification of existing legislation, while at the same time 
effectively pursuing the objectives of European financial law 
(supra, II.2.-3.). 
1. Order transmission and execution as core activity 
Our proposal addresses the platform activity as such. The 
platform’s core activity is bringing together capital supply and 
demand. MiFID II refers to this activity as ‘reception and 
transmission of orders’ and ‘execution of orders on behalf of 
clients’ (with regard to financial instruments).129 While other 
regulated activities have similar effects, including operating 
markets of various types,130 we deem order transmission and 
execution to be an adequate point of focus for a light-touch, yet 
efficient regulatory framework. 
MIFID II provides an authorisation and passport for a specific 
type of small investment firm: The authorisation requires an 
                                                          
127
  See for Italy Legislative Decree No. 179 of 19 Oct. 2012, subsequently 
converted into Law No. 221 of 17 Dec. 2012, was implemented by Consob 
Regulation No. 18592 of 26 June 2013 (drawing on MiFID on MiFID for 
equity based crowdfunding models); Nigro & Santoro, supra note 104. The 
MiFID-style licensing requirements imposed minimum costs on the 
platforms which they will transfer to issuers that are funded via the platform 
and make new entry in the market for crowdfunding platforms more 
expensive, see Gabison, supra note 59, at 22. Some commentators deem this 
law a nuisance rather than nurture of the crowdfunding development. See 
Edoardo d’Ippolito, Matteo Musitelli & Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi, 
supra note 104 (referring to the MiFID suitability test as main hindrance for 
the Italian crowdfunding scheme); Aschenbeck-Florange et.al., Regulation 
of Crowdfunding in Germany, the UK, Spain and Italy and the Impact of the 
European Single Market, 24 et.seq (A publication of the European 
Crowdfunding Network in association with Osborne Clarke, 2013) available 
at http://www.osborneclarke.com/media/filer_public/51/b3/51b3007b-73aa-
4b9a-a19d-380fc1d6ff35/regulation_of_crowdfunding_ecn_oc.pdf.  
128
 Note that this approach differs from the exemptions stated in Art. 3 MiFID 
for domestic bespoke regimes, cited in European Commission, 
Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets Union, supra note 2, at 19. 
129
  See Annex I A(1) and (2) of MiFID II. 
130
  See Annex I A(8) and (9) of MiFID II. 
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initial capital requirement of EUR125,000. Member States may 
even reduce the level of required initial capital to EUR50,000 if 
the firm doesn’t hold client money or securities.131 In order to 
make use of that ‘MiFID light’ status, the investment firm is 
prevented from dealing in financial instruments on its own 
account or underwriting issues of financial instruments on a 
firm-commitment basis. It is authorised to receive and transmit 
investors’ orders for financial instruments and to execute 
investors’ orders.132 
2. Licensing & Operating Conditions 
a) Art. 4(1) No. 2 (c) CRR 
From the licensing conditions (supra, III.3), besides the fact that 
there is a licensing requirement as such, capital requirements 
erect the most effective barrier to business. Our understanding of 
platform activity as order reception, transmission and execution 
allows for reliance on an exemption from the CRD IV/CRR 
framework. Article 4(1) No. 2 (c) CRR exempts certain 
intermediaries from the onerous CRD IV / CRR capital 
requirements. These include investment firms that do not 
function as depositaries, do not hold client assets and that focus 
on order reception and transmission, order execution, portfolio 
management and investment advice. These CRR-exempted 
investment firms are subject to minimum capital requirements of 
EUR50,000 or EUR125,000 respectively, calculated as initial 
capital plus a quarter of the annual overhead cost.133 
The MiFID licensing rules must be read in the context of 
crowdfunding. For instance, the knowledge and experience 
necessary for passing the fit-and-proper test relates to running an 
internet platform and investing in small- and medium-sized 
enterprises rather than the general distribution of financial 
products to the public. Further, crowdfunding platforms 
regulated under the MiFID light approach would need to keep 
adequate records, including the recording of telephone 
conversations or electronic communications relating to the 
reception, transmission and execution of client orders.134 What 
constitutes adequate must be defined in light of MiFID’s general 
mission to sustain proportionality. A platform with little traffic 
will be subject to different requirements than one platform with 
millions of daily users. 
b) Operating conditions 
MiFID’s most costly provisions are framed as operating 
conditions in Ch. II MiFID II. Notwithstanding any exemptions 
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 CRD IV, art. 29(3). 
132
 CRD IV, art. 29(1). 
133
  See art. 95 et seq. CRR and art. 15 MiFID II. 
134
  See art. 16 (7) MiFID II. 
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discussed infra (IV.4.), crowdfunding providers are subject to 
the MiFID rules addressing: 
• Conflicts of interests135;  
• Duty to act honestly, fairly and with the best interests of 
the investor in mind136; 
• Marketing137;  
• Cost transparency138;  
• Kick-back rules139; 
• The intermediary’s remuneration140;  
• Documentation and reporting141; and   
• Best execution142. 
Note that not all rules relating to investment advice and portfolio 
management143 apply. Further, since Article 25 (4) MiFID II is 
limited to investment advice and portfolio management, the 
onerous ‘know your client’requirements144 do not apply.  
c) In particular: MiFID Product Governance Rules 
As part of the MiFID II product governance rules145 the 
investment firm needs to understand the characteristics and 
                                                          
135
 MiFID II recital (9) and art. 6 (f) of COMMISSION DELEGATED 
REGULATED (EU) …/… of C 4417 final on Supplementing Directive 
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with Regard to 
Regulatory Technical Standards on Information and Requirements for the 
Authorisation of Investment Firms (July 14, 2016); MiFID II recital (15) 
(45-48), (51-52) (57) (59) and arts. 27, 29, 33-36 of COMMISSION 
DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) .../... of C 2398 final on 
Supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council as Regards Organisational Requirements and Operating Conditions 
for Investment Firms and Defined Terms for the Purposes of that Directive 
(April 25, 2016).  
136
  Id. MiFID II of COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) .../... 
of C 2398 final, recital.(15) (75-76) (91) (100) (116) (April 25, 2016).  
137
 Id. recital (61-62) (65-66), arts. 36-37 
138
 Id. recital (1) (74) (82) (114) arts.50, 89.  
139
 Id. recital (76); see recital (76) and art. 24(9) of DIRECTIVE 2014/65/EU 
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on 
Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
Directive 2011/61/EU (May 15, 2014). 
140
 Id. recital (40-41), art. 2(5), 27. 
141
  Id. recital (1) (28) (93) (96-98) (113-114), arts. 21 (a)(e), 22.2(c) and 3(b), 
59-62, 76, 83-84. 
142
  Id. recital (90) (102-108), arts. 59.4(m), 64-66. 
143
  Id. distribution strategy about the distributor, recital 44-46, at 29 et seq.  
144
  Id. identification of the target market by the distributor: categories to be 
considered, recital 26-27, at 9. 
145
  See Della Negra, The Effects of the ESMA’s Powers on Domestic Contract 
Law, in REGULATING AND SUPERVISING EUROPEAN FINANCIAL 
MARKETS: MORE RISKS THAN ACHIEVEMENTS 160 et seq. (Mads 
Frederico Andenas and Gudula Deipenbrock eds., 2016). See recital (15-18) 
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relevant target market of each financial instrument.146 These rules 
address conflicts of interest in the distribution chain of financial 
products created by commissions and other originator-oriented 
pay models.  
In the context of crowdfunding platforms, these rules need re-
reading since crowdfunding platforms rely on funding rather 
than distribution. If read with the objective of crowdfunding in 
mind, they would lead to a partial but not excessive regulatory 
burden. For instance, consider the rules imposed on product 
originators and product distributors. Platforms offer 
crowdfunding projects. In turn, they must have in place adequate 
arrangements to obtain sufficient information on the product 
from the originator. In fact, crowdfunding platforms tend to 
engage in due diligence of the funded firms prior to making them 
available on their platforms. If they do, they will have the 
information required by Article 16 MiFID II.147  
According to our crowdfunding understanding, the SME rather 
than the platform is creating the investment product (see the 
originator-related rules of Article 24 (2) MiFID II). In turn, rules 
relating to product origination148 do not apply to the platform.  
                                                          
(20), Arts. 9, 10 of COMMISSION DELEGATED DIRECTIVE (EU) .../... 
of C 2031 on Supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council with Regard to Safeguarding of Financial 
Instruments and Funds Belonging to Clients, Product Governance 
Obligations and the Rules Applicable to the Provision or Reception of Fees, 
Commissions or Any Monetary or Non-Monetary Benefits, (April 7, 2016); 
ESMA, Consultation Paper Guidelines on Product Governance 
Requirements 2016/1436 (Oct.5, 2016); ESMA, Technical Advice to the 
Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR – Final Report, ESMA 2014/1569, ¶ 
2.7. (Dec. 19 2014). 
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 Art. 16 s. 3 sub 6 MiFID II. 
147
 Art. 16 (3) MiFID II, sub 5 (“An investment firm which manufactures 
financial instruments shall make available to any distributor all appropriate 
information on the financial instrument and the product approval process, 
including the identified target market of the financial instrument.”). On 
MiIFD II’s target market requirement see recital (17-20), arts. 9 (1)(9)(11-
14), 10 (1)(2)(3)(5)(7)(8) of COMMISSION DELEGATED DIRECTIVE 
(EU) .../... of 7 April 2016 on Supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council with Regard to Safeguarding of 
Financial Instruments and Funds Belonging to Clients, Product Governance 
Obligations and the Rules Applicable to the Provision or Reception of Fees, 
Commissions or Any Monetary or Non-Monetary Benefits; ESMA, 
Consultation Paper on Draft guidelines on MiFID II product governance 
requirements,  ESMA supra note 143 at 5 et seq.; Martin Brenncke, Der 
Zielmarkt eines Finanzinstruments nach der MiFID II, 
WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN 2015 1173.  
148
  See Consultation Paper of ESMA/2016/1436, supra note 133, recital 39, 
at.12 and related to distribution of products manufactured by entities not 
subject to MiFID II product governance requirements, recital 52-54, at. 31 
 35
3. CF modifications? 
If our proposal is implemented and the platform’s core activity 
is deemed to be a MiFID activity, a licensing requirement will 
apply. In some countries, the minimum cost of doing business 
will be greater than it is today due to the fixed cost of regulation 
for regulated entities. While we generally accept this, in return 
for a much bigger pan-European market we seek to mitigate the 
negative impact of regulation-induced fixed costs by proposing 
some modifications that reduce costs for small-scale platform 
start-ups. 
In particular, our concept requires three modifications of the 
MiFID framework.  
a) Disregard of ‘financial instrument’ restriction – 
Neutrality as to Legal Form 
First, it shall apply to all crowdfunding platforms regardless of 
whether the product is a financial instrument. This is to ensure 
that (1) the European passport functions smoothly across Europe 
regardless of which legal form is widely used for crowdfunding 
in the particular European country (counter path dependency), 
and (2) the legal form of investment can meet the respective 
SME’s most suitable legal form rather than a regulatory demand. 
For instance, the crowdfunding license should extend to 
instruments such as convertible bonds, limited partnership units, 
individual debt obligations and the provision of direct debt. 
Further, the crowdfunding license shall apply to both 
crowdlending and equity crowdfunding platforms that function 
as agents without taking any funding obligations onto their own 
balance sheets.  
b) List of applicable rules 
Second, while the above interpretation of MiFID II derives from 
an understanding of the legal text, additional certainty is 
achieved with an exclusive list of MiFID II and MiFIR 
provisions that do not apply to crowdfunding platforms whose 
activity is limited to order reception, transmission and execution. 
Such a list could be added to MiFID II implementing legislation. 
For instance, it could be expressly stated that the platform merely 
offers a crowdfunding opportunity, without recommending or 
manufacturing it.  
However, we do not propose a lighter touch with regard to cost 
transparency and investor protection. In fact, the opaque cost 
structures of platforms that charge both the funded firm and 
funders for their services is a cause for concern. Our anecdotal 
evidence in this regard shows a wide array of fee models and fee 
sizes, ranging from one percent to fifteen percent if fees for 
funder, funded firms and service charges are taken together.149 It 
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is crucial that the same transparency standards developed over 
the years for regulated intermediaries similarly apply for 
crowdfunding platforms, where most funders are vulnerable to 
hidden fees, and most funded firms have little choice but to 
accept the terms set by the platform.  
c) From ‘too small to care’ to ‘too big to fail’ 
Third, a balanced risk analysis follows the evolution of any 
FinTech business from (1) too-small-to-care, to (2) too-large-to-
ignore and then to (3) too-big-to-fail (TBTF).150 The MIFID-
light framework focuses on investor protection at the too-large-
to-ignore stage. This scenario requires two modifications to 
reflect the needs of the too-small-to-care and too-big-to-fail 
stages.  
On the one hand, we propose a relevance threshold of 
EUR250,000, which refers to the total transaction volume 
processed by the platform.151 While redress through private law 
will be available for fraud below this threshold, no regulation 
should apply. This minimum threshold would enable platform 
start-ups to pilot and test new business models with little risk, 
and hopefully prove to investors that their innovations work. In 
balancing the need for investor protection with the need to 
further innovation, we believe that the overall risk level to 
investors from very small platforms is acceptable. Further, the 
EUR250,000 transaction threshold ensures that a certain 
vagueness on definitions, for instance delineating donation-
based platforms from lending and investment platforms, does not 
impair the functioning of the regulatory system. Finally, 
supervising very small platforms is expensive for regulators and 
is in many cases superfluous. Experience tells us that most start-
ups fail. The same insight applies to platform start-ups. Many 
platforms will vanish before surpassing the EUR250,000 
transaction threshold. Hence, there is no need to spend scarce 
resources on their supervision.  
On the other hand once regulators come to the conclusion that a 
platform is of systemic importance, for example if the platform 
substitutes for systemically significant financial institutions 
(TBTF) or the platform is linked to an institutional client base 
(TCTF), we recommend measures to control and limit systemic 
risk. These include (a) structural requirements for the platform 
(quarantine provisions, IT capabilities, capital adequacy, 
minimum capital requirements for maintenance and remedial 
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  DW Arner, J Barberis and RP Buckley, ‘The Evolution of FinTech: A New 
Post-Crisis Paradigm?’ (2016) 47 (4) Georgetown Journal of International 
Law, 1271. 
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  This threshold is equal to 500 funding decisions if we assume that the 
average funding contribution amounts to 500 EUR. Data as to 2015 and 
2016 suggest that the average contribution is a little less than that amount. 
[Cambridge Centre?*] 
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purposes, and segregation of EU/EEA activities from non-
EU/EEA activities) and (b) empowering regulators to shut down 
the activity (while preserving customer data), or to appoint a 
commissioner to run the quarantined EU/EEA platform business 
in the public interest.152  
4. Additional activities 
Additional rules apply if platforms go further than simply order 
execution and transmission. Our base case scenario excludes 
platforms interested in channelling investors’ money via the 
platform’s own bank account to the SME or that function as 
depositories for investors’ money, nor do we consider variants 
in which platforms provide advice to investors (albeit 
automatically) as to which investment they should choose. These 
activities are, for the most part, subject to the PSD II or a more 
extensive, or even full, MiFID II license. For instance, if a 
platform engages in providing investment advice with a search 
tool that relies on investors’ risk sensitivity or other suitability 
criteria, the respective MiFID rules for investment advice will 
apply on top of the base case scenario rules laid out above.  
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have made three contributions to the discussion 
of how to regulate crowdfunding. First, we dismiss the idea that 
the risks of CF153 are mitigated due to the relatively low size of 
contributions per investor. Regulation of a crowdfunding 
platform is necessary since the parties seeking capital are small 
start-ups with little choice as to funding and are less able to bear 
regulatory costs, while many funders are unsophisticated private 
investors in need of investor protection.154 Further, both the 
established rationale of financial law (investor, financial system 
and stakeholder concerns) and the facilitation of the European 
single market warrant regulation. Second, we demonstrated that 
regulating the platform as the ‘manager’ of a crowdfunding 
scheme is the road the European Commission should take when 
implementing the CMU action plan. Third, we set out details of 
a MiFID II-oriented, light touch approach to crowdfunding 
regulation, based on the exemption provided by Article 4 (1) No. 
2 (c) CRR. The MiFID-light framework is an adequate base case 
scenario to address the too-large-to-ignore stage of platform 
business where the total transaction amount exceeds 
EUR250,000 p.a. In addition, systemic risk-oriented regulation 
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  We have addressed the arguemnt that crowdfunding platforms are too small 
to provide a risk to the financial system supra, at II.2. 
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  European Commission, Summary, supra note 80, at 6. A recent European 
Commission consultation on crowdfunding showed that one in four 
respondents considers the risks of fraud or misleading advertising in 
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for very large platforms should be embedded as a preventive 
measure. 
Our three contributions would mitigate information 
asymmetry155 and protect the market by building investor 
confidence. We would proceed not despite, but in recognition of, 
the economic potential of a well-functioning cross-border 
crowdfunding market in Europe. A light-touch regulation of 
crowdfunding provides the regulatory basis for a European 
crowdfunding passport, based on MiIFD, that mitigates against 
adverse effects from possible over-regulation after the financial 
crisis156 and ensures some level of investor protection at the same 
time. This comes with the welcome side effects of (1) better 
information on the part of regulators and (2) the potential 
creation of a level playing field with other (regulated) forms of 
finance.  
If our proposal is adopted, some crowdfunding platforms will 
not pass regulatory scrutiny or, given the fixed cost of regulation, 
unless their transaction volume surpasses the relevance 
threshold, will prove too small to remain in business. This is, 
however, a desired effect as regulation functions to single out 
less viable market participants, thereby ensuring that the public 
puts a higher level of trust in the remaining (licensed) entities.157  
Our proposal would ensure that (1) very small platforms can test 
and enter into a pilot stage with some clients, (2) reliable 
platforms can grow across borders and achieve economies of 
scale previously unavailable to them, while their conduct is 
regulated according to a simple yet flexible set of rules that 
already exists and ensures sufficient transparency, and (3) that 
systemic risk is monitored. This should provide a bright outlook 
for professionally managed platforms, investors and SMEs alike. 
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  Otherwise crowdfunding markets could render markets for lemons, see 
Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 591 et seq.; Tomboc, supra note 7, at 263 et seq. 
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  The “regulatory stimulus cycle”, where policymakers react and contribute to 
boom and bust cycles of financial markets is prominently examined. See 
Erik Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation (2014). 
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  In fact, whether regulation will dry out innovation is a question of market 
maturity: The largest European crowdfunding market – the UK – draws on a 
MiFID-style platform regulation which is even more stringent than the one 
suggested herein. 
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